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and Intergenerational Distribution
BEN J. HEIJDRA and JENNY E. LIGTHART*
The paper studies the dynamic macroeconomic and welfare effects of tax policy in
the context of an overlapping-generations model of the Yaari-Blanchard type for a
closed economy. The model is extended to allow for endogenous labor supply and
three tax instruments—namely, a capital tax, labor income tax, and consumption
tax. It is shown that labor taxes increase welfare of old generations whereas
capital and consumption taxes reduce their welfare. [JEL D60, H23, H63]
T
axation has an immediate impact on resource allocation—via its effect on
labor supply and goods consumption—as well as an intertemporal effect
through, among others, its effect on investment decisions of firms and savings
decisions of households. Given the cumulative character of physical and knowl-
edge capital formation, current decisions on taxes made by short-lived individuals
may have long-lasting effects, affecting current and future generations’ welfare.
The present paper addresses both the macroeconomic and intergenerational
welfare aspects of tax policy in a Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) model of over-
lapping generations. Three tax instruments are considered—namely, a capital tax,
labor income tax, and consumption tax.
A large body of literature on the dynamic macroeconomic effects of tax policy
has developed during the past two decades. Early studies on this topic (e.g.,
Feldstein, 1974; and Bernheim, 1981) were based on neoclassical growth models,
featuring arbitrarily specified savings behavior, and thus are not well suited to
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Broer, Liam P. Ebrill, and Robert P. Flood for comments on an earlier draft.analyzing the long-run growth effects of economic policies. Contributions in the
1980s addressed this shortcoming by modeling an infinitely lived representative
household, which, endowed with perfect foresight, determines its optimal savings
rate as the outcome of an intertemporal optimization procedure.1 This literature
argued that capital taxes reduce private savings and output in the steady state.
Typically, labor supply was taken to be exogenous, so that the employment effects
of policy-induced changes in capital formation could not be studied.
Recently, various authors have employed overlapping-generations models, as
developed by Diamond (1965) and Yaari-Blanchard, to study the intergenerational
effects of fiscal policy. The classic Yaari-Blanchard approach models a continuum of
households that face an exogenous probability of death. In this setup, current gener-
ations are unconnected to previous and future generations—due to the absence of a
bequest motive—and differ in the amount of accumulated financial wealth. Most
studies have primarily employed the analytically more tractable Diamond2 model
(e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, 1995; and Ihori, 1996), but recently, a few
authors have studied tax policy issues employing the Yaari-Blanchard framework.
Notably, Bovenberg (1993), who analyzes the distributional effects of capital taxa-
tion in a small open economy, and Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998), who look at
capital taxes in a closed economy setting. Both studies show that old generations
lose out in terms of welfare when capital taxes are introduced, while generations
born at the time of the policy change gain. Recently, Heijdra and Ligthart (2000)
have extended the Yaari-Blanchard model for a closed economy to include endoge-
nous (intertemporal) labor supply and various instruments of tax policy.
The analysis in the present paper builds on the analytical model of Heijdra and
Ligthart (2000), which is employed for two purposes. The first is to develop a
versatile graphical apparatus, facilitating a qualitative analysis of the main
macroeconomic linkages and tax effects.3 As such, it can serve as a useful tool to
policymakers trying to come to grips with the intertemporal effects of taxes. The
graphical framework—and, more generally, the underlying model—encompasses
a variety of special cases with respect to household characteristics and behavior.
In particular, life spans of households and elasticities of (intertemporal) labor
supply can be varied. In this way, the framework is a helpful tool in the study of
key results from influential models—namely, the prototypical Barro (1974)-
Ramsey (1928) model and Blanchard’s (1985) model—as well as in providing
new insights. It is shown that the equivalence of labor taxes and consumption
taxes, a well-known result in dynamic general equilibrium models with infinitely
lived households, no longer holds in a world of overlapping generations. Indeed,
consumption taxes may increase savings and output if the investment effect asso-
ciated with intergenerational turnover exceeds the labor supply effect, whereas
labor taxes unambiguously reduce savings.
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1See Brock and Turnovsky (1981), Turnovsky (1982, 1990), Abel and Blanchard (1983), and Judd
(1985, 1987a, 1987b).
2Diamond (1965) assumes that individuals live for two discrete time periods, according to a life cycle
in which they work and save during the first period and consume out of their savings in the second period.
3Rather than working with a linearized version of the model, the main schedules are depicted in
nonlinear form.The second purpose of this paper is to compute the intergenerational welfare
effects for a plausibly calibrated version of the extended Yaari-Blanchard model.
A number of studies (e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; and Fullerton and
Rogers, 1996) have addressed intergenerational tax matters in life cycle models,
featuring a detailed general equilibrium structure calibrated for the U.S. economy.
Compared to the present model, these frameworks are less able to provide clear
insights in the key transmission mechanisms of policy shocks. To date, however,
few studies have employed Yaari-Blanchard models to study welfare effects.
Notable exceptions are the earlier mentioned papers of Bovenberg (1993) and
Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998). 
The present paper extends this literature to a menu of tax instruments. It shows
that the political attractiveness of tax instruments differs due to their disparate
effect on the intergenerational distribution of welfare. Capital and consumption
taxes are shown to reduce welfare of existing generations, more so for the older
generations, whereas generations born at the time of policy implementation gain
in terms of welfare. Old generations experience a bigger welfare loss under
consumption taxation. The simulation results for labor taxes indicate that old
generations enjoy welfare gains, but future generations and generations born in the
new steady state lose out. Therefore, from a political economy point of view, the
introduction of labor taxes is likely to get more support in a popular vote. It may
provide one of the reasons why labor taxes are so prevalent in developed countries.
I. The Model of Overlapping Generations
Model Structure
The perpetual youth approach of Blanchard (1985) is employed and extended to
include endogenous labor supply and various tax instruments. The economy
consists of a household sector, firm sector, and a government. Households are
assumed to maximize lifetime utility—featuring a log-linear felicity function with
private consumption and leisure as arguments—subject to their dynamic budget
constraint. The latter says that the return on the household’s financial wealth, plus
its net labor income, is either consumed or saved. The production sector is char-
acterized by a large number of firms that produce an identical good under perfect
competition. The representative firm maximizes its net present value subject to the
capital accumulation and production constraint. Households own the firms, which
is their only way to accumulate financial wealth. The government provides lump-
sum transfers to households, which are financed by capital, labor, and consump-
tion taxes. It does not issue bonds.4
The model equations, variables, and parameter definitions are presented in
Table 1.5 The first two equations describe the dynamic part of the model.
Aggregate consumption growth evolves according to equation (T.1) and differs
from consumption growth for individual cohorts (i.e., the first term on the right)
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4Issues of tax smoothing are thus abstracted from.
5A technical description of the model can be found in Heijdra and Ligthart (2000).because of the turnover of generations (i.e., the second term on the right).6 Note
that individual consumption growth is a positive function of the wedge between
the rate of interest and pure rate of time preference. Equation (T.2) describes the
net accumulation of physical capital, which equals net output minus consumption.
The static part of the model is represented by equations (T.3)–(T.7). The house-
hold’s leisure-consumption decision rule is described by equation (T.3), which
relates the value of leisure to consumption and the tax wedge, consisting of labor
taxes, tL, and consumption taxes, tC. Equations (T.4) and (T.5) represent the firm’s
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L(t) Employment α Pure rate of time preference
K(t)C apital stock β Death (=birth) rate (β≥ 0)
C(t)A ggregate consumption ε L Production share of labor (0 < ε L<1 )
Y(t)A ggregate net output ε C Utility share of consumption
W(t) Real wage rate γ 0 Productivity parameter (γ 0 >0 )
r(t) Real interest rate
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6At each instant a cross section of the existing population dies and is replaced by a new generation.
Since average consumption exceeds consumption by newly born agents (that are born without any finan-
cial wealth), the generational turnover effect drags down aggregate consumption growth.marginal conditions for, respectively, labor and capital. Since capital is taxed at the
firm level, the capital tax, tK,a ppears in equation (T.5). The production function
and the government budget constraint are given by equations (T.6) and (T.7).
Graphical Apparatus
The dynamic part of the model consists of the aggregate capital stock (a predeter-
mined variable) and aggregate consumption (a forward-looking or jump variable).
It can be summarized graphically by means of a phase diagram (Figure 1),
featuring two schedules, the constant capital stock equilibrium (CSE) curve and
the consumption flow equilibrium (CFE) locus. Steady-state (or long-run) equi-
librium is attained at the intersection of the CSE and CFE curves in point E0.7
Although the figure is drawn in such a way that the equilibrium occurs on the
upper branch of the CFE curve, it is quite possible that the structural parameters
generate an outcome on the upward sloping section of the CFE curve (see also the
discussion on the CFE curve below). Given the configuration of arrows, indicating
the direction of motion, it is clear that this equilibrium is saddle-point stable, and
that the saddle path, SP0,i s   upward sloping.8









Figure 1. Phase Diagram for the Overlapping Generations Model
7The mathematical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
8Being the set of points from which the dynamic system converges to the steady state.The CSE curve is upward sloping and represents (C, K) combinations for
which net investment is zero. Points above the CSE curve are associated with a
falling capital stock over time because goods consumption is too high and labor
supply (and hence production) is too low. The opposite is the case for points below
the CSE curve. 
The second schedule, the CFE curve, depicts the aggregate consumption
growth equation augmented for the turnover of generations. The position and slope
of the CFE curve is determined by two effects, which work in opposite directions:
(i) the “generational turnover” effect (see footnote 6); and (ii) the labor supply
effect. The CFE curve is nearly horizontal close to the origin, where labor supply
is approaching full exogeneity (as assumed in the standard Blanchard model) and
upward sloping on the section P1P2. In contrast, on the section P2P3 labor supply
is fairly elastic, yielding a CFE curve that is downward sloping and steeper than
the respective CFE curve for an infinitely lived representative agent (given by the
dashed line connecting points P3 and P4). When the elasticity of intertemporal
labor supply approaches infinity the two CFE curves coincide.9 The labor supply
effect and short-run factor market dynamics can be illustrated with the help of
some simple supply and demand diagrams (Box 1).
The dynamic forces operating on aggregate consumption along the two
branches of the CFE curve can now be studied. Consider a point on the lower
branch of the curve, where the labor supply effect is dominated by the generational
turnover effect. Holding the capital stock constant, an increase in aggregate
consumption leads to a small decrease in labor supply—as the relatively steep
labor supply curve in Figure 2 shifts only a little—and, consequently, depresses
the interest rate by a small amount. At the same time, the capital-consumption
ratio falls, reducing the drag on aggregate consumption growth due to population
turnover. The net effect of both forces is a rising aggregate consumption growth
profile for points above the lower branch of the CFE curve. Points above the upper
branch of the curve feature a falling consumption growth profile, reflecting a fall
in the interest rate, which exceeds the growth-reducing effect operating through
the capital-consumption ratio.
II. The Dynamic Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Policy: 
A Graphical Analysis
In this section the short- and long-run effects of the three tax instruments on the
macroeconomy are analyzed with the aid of the graphical apparatus developed in
the previous section. To keep matters simple, attention is restricted to an unantic-
ipated and permanent change to a new tax policy. The government is assumed to
maintain a balanced budget at each point in time; revenues raised by taxes are
rebated to households in a lump-sum fashion. Further, it is assumed that the labor
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9Note that in a representative agent (or Barro-Ramsey) model, aggregate and individual consumption
coincide so that the CFE curve represents the locus of points where the rate of interest equals the rate of
pure time preference. supply effect is relatively strong, implying that the initial equilibrium is located on
the downward sloping section of the CFE curve (see Figure 1). Notably, the qual-
itative allocation effects of the capital and labor taxes are not affected by the slope
of the CFE curve. However, it is demonstrated below that, for the qualitative
effects of a consumption tax change, the size of the generational turnover effect
does matter.
Capital Tax
The effects of the capital tax are illustrated with the aid of Figures 2 and 3. An
increase in the capital tax rate shifts the CFE locus to the left in Figure 3. On
impact, this leads to a fall in the demand for capital, which depresses the rate of
interest for a given initial stock of capital. As a result, consumption today is made
more attractive than future consumption, as represented by the vertical jump from
point E0 to A, which is located on the new saddle path, SP1. The increase in
consumption shifts the labor supply schedule to the left (see Figure 2) so that
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Box 1. The Labor Supply Effect and Short-Run Factor Market Dynamics
Figure 2 depicts the rental market for the capital and labor markets, which can be used to analyze
short-run factor market dynamics. In the left-hand panel, the demand for capital (KD) is a standard
downward sloping schedule due to diminishing returns to capital. An increase in employment1 or a
decrease in the capital tax rate shifts KD up. The intersection of KD and the vertical schedule K0—
representing a given capital stock—yields the short-run real interest rate that clears the rental market
for capital at point E 0. The right-hand side panel features a downward sloping labor demand sched-
ule (LD) for a given capital stock. Labor supply (L S) is an upward sloping schedule, reflecting the
(positive) pure substitution effect of a wage change, which is isolated by incorporating the (negative)
income effect in consumption. As a result, a rise (fall) in consumption shifts the labor supply curve
to the left (right).
The figures can now be used to show that the rate of interest depends positively on consumption
and negatively on the capital stock. An increase in consumption (say from C0 to C1) moves the labor
supply curve to the left (from L S(W,C0) to LS(W,C1)), and for a given capital stock, employment
falls from L 0 to L1 and the wage rate rises (represented by the move from E 0 to A). As a result, the
capital demand schedule shifts to the left (from KD(r,L 0) to KD(r,L1)) in the left-hand panel of
Figure 2, inducing a fall in the rate of interest. It can be demonstrated easily that a rise in the labor
tax or consumption tax has qualitatively similar effects on the labor and capital markets in the short
run. Intuitively, labor and consumption taxes reduce households’ real after-tax wage, inducing them
to substitute leisure for consumption. 
An increase in the capital stock, from K0 to K1, has two effects on the rate of interest: a direct
effect, which depresses the rental price of capital from E 0 to B′ in the left-hand panel of Figure 2,
represented by a downward movement along the initial capital demand schedule, and, an induced
effect, operating through the labor market. An increase in the capital stock boosts labor demand,
leading to an increase in wages and employment, which, in turn, increases the demand for capital
(from KD(r,L 0) to KD(r,L 2)) and pushes up the interest rate—represented by the move from B′ to
B. In sum, the net effect of a larger capital stock is depicted by the fall in the interest rate from
point E 0 to B.2
1Note that labor and capital are cooperative factors given the assumed Cobb-Douglas production
structure.
























Figure 3. Effects of the Capital Taxemployment and output fall, while the wage rate rises in the short run. The reduc-
tion in employment prompts a further decline in capital demand, depressing the
rate of interest even more. 
The simultaneous increase in consumption and decrease in production
crowds out net investment, causing the capital stock to fall over time. In the
medium term, the optimal time profile of consumption is downward sloping, so
that consumption also starts to decline after its initial increase—depicted by the
move from point A to E1 along the SP1 curve in Figure 3. In the long run, output
and consumption decline proportionally, but steady-state employment is unaf-
fected. Intuitively, the reduction in the capital stock depresses the firm’s labor
demand, but the fall in consumption boosts labor supply, depressing long-run
wages and causing employment to move back to its old level (see Figure 2). Note
that the after-tax interest rate recovers somewhat during transition, but remains
below its old equilibrium level. Part of the burden of capital taxes is thus borne
by capital owners, a result which is impossible in a dynamic representative agent
model. The latter features an exogenous steady-state rate of interest that equals
the pure rate of time preference. Table 2 compares the short- and long-run results
for both classes of models.  
Labor Income Tax
The effects of the labor income tax can be studied with the aid of Figures 2 and
4. In Figure 4, the CSE curve shifts down and the CFE curve shifts to the left,
reducing consumption from point E0 to A. An increase in the labor tax shifts both
the capital demand and labor supply schedules to the left (see Figure 2). On
impact, the reduced capital demand causes a fall in the rate of interest and
consumption, which, subsequently, shifts the labor supply curve to the right. The
net effect on the labor market is a reduction in employment, which causes a fall
in short-run output. Both gross and after-tax wages rise, whereas the rate of
interest declines, reflecting that capital bears part of the short-run incidence of
labor taxes.10
In the medium term, consumption, physical capital, and output decline when
the economy moves from point A to E1 in Figure 4. In terms of Figure 2, the fall
in the capital stock gradually shifts the labor demand curve further to the left,
giving rise to additional reductions in employment, which are partially offset by
increased labor supply (induced by the negative income effect of a fall in
consumption). In the long run, both employment and the capital stock fall. The
optimal capital-labor ratio is unaffected, however, which explains why gross
wages and interest rates (and hence the C/K ratio) do not change in the long run.
After-tax wages decline if intertemporal labor supply is elastic, implying that
workers fully bear the long-run incidence of labor taxes. This is in line with results
derived in a representative agent framework (Table 2).
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10Tax incidence is defined as the after-tax wage (including transfers) for labor and the after-tax rate
of interest for capital.Consumption Tax
From the tax policy literature it is well known that in a representative agent model,
a consumption tax is equivalent to a labor tax with respect to its effects on the
macroeconomy.11 In such a model, the steady-state rate of interest is given, so that
the consumption tax, or equivalent labor tax, does not affect the household’s
intertemporal tradeoff between present and future consumption. Indeed, taxation
affects savings only through its impact on a household’s level of wealth. In the
presence of overlapping generations, this familiar equivalence result no longer
holds because the generational turnover effect now works in the opposite direction
of the labor supply effect. 
For a marginal increase in the consumption tax, the CSE schedule shifts
down, whereas the CFE line shifts to the right (left) for points below (above) the
auxiliary line P1P2 (see Figure 5). Consumption jumps down on impact from
point E0 to A. The graphical framework set out in Box 1 can be used to explain
this effect. An increase in the consumption tax shifts the labor supply curve to
the left and the capital demand curve down, causing a reduction in the interest
rate and a fall in consumption, which, on its turn, shifts the labor supply locus
partially back. The net effect on the labor market is a fall in employment that











Figure 4. Effects of the Labor Income Tax
11The change in the consumption tax must also be unanticipated and permanent to obtain equivalence.
See Summers (1981), and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).increases the capital intensity of production. Consequently, the after-tax return
on capital declines and the aggregate consumption growth profile becomes
downward sloping. In the impact period, the reduction in consumption is domi-
nated by the fall in output, thus having a negative effect on net investment. Over
time, the capital stock and output fall, which is represented by the movement
from point A to E1 in Figure 5. In the new steady state, employment and capital
are both lower than their pre-reform values, but the fall in employment is larger,
yielding an increase in the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. As a result, the steady
state rate of interest is below its initial value; part of the burden of the consump-
tion tax is thus borne by capital owners, who do not bear any incidence in a
representative agent setting (Table 2).  
Matters are quite different if the generational turnover effect dominates the
labor supply effect; savings may increase. This can be explained as follows. An
increase in the consumption tax causes a redistribution of income from old to
young generations. Old agents have more wealth accumulated and consume more
than recently born agents and thus face a larger tax bill. Since the additional tax
revenue is recycled to all generations in an age-independent manner, old genera-
tions are hit harder by the consumption tax than young generations. On impact,
the proportional consumption difference between old and young agents falls,
giving rise to an increase in aggregate consumption growth. However, the level of
aggregate consumption falls, but outweighs the fall in production, so as to yield
an increase in net investment. In the new steady state, the capital stock and the
capital-labor ratio are higher so that the rate of interest is below its old equilib-
rium value.
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Table 2. Summary of Qualitative Effects of Tax Policy1
model2 period YKLCWr
Capital tax OLG 03 –0–++–
∞ 4 ––0–––
RA 0  –0–++–
∞ ––0––0
Labor tax OLG 0  –0––+–
∞ ––––00
RA 0  –0––+–
∞ ––––00
Consumption tax OLG 0  –0––+–
∞ ––––+–
RA 0  –0––+–
∞ ––––00
1It is assumed that the generational turnover effect is dominated by the labor supply effect.
2Two variants are considered: an overlapping generations (OLG) model and an infinitely lived
representative agent (RA) model. 
3The impact effect is denoted by t = 0.
4The long-run effect is denoted by t→∞ .III. Intergenerational Welfare Effects: Simulation Experiments 
Tax policy affects the intergenerational distribution of welfare. This section
attempts to quantify the intergenerational welfare effects of various tax policy
instruments by presenting numerical simulations of the model set out in Section I. 
Methodology
To  explain the intuition behind the welfare effects, instantaneous utility (or
felicity) of generation v at time t, Λ (v,t) is decomposed in a “quantity” component
(represented by full consumption of generation v at time t, CF(v,t), which is
defined as the value of goods consumption plus the opportunity cost of leisure)
and a “price” component (that is, the cost-of-living index, pΛ (t)), which affects all
generations equally:
(1)
Welfare of generation v at time t is defined as:
(2) Uvt v t
t
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∞
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Figure 5. Effects of the Consumption Taxwhere α denotes the pure rate of time preference, β is the probability of death (that
is equal to the birth rate so as to keep the population size constant), and ε C is the
utility share of consumption. Utility rises if full consumption increases or the cost-
of-living index decreases. A fall in gross wages or a rise in labor taxes decreases
the cost-of-living index because the opportunity cost of leisure is reduced. Raising
consumption taxes increases the cost-of-living index. Note that changes in the rate
of interest affect welfare indirectly through its effect on full consumption.
The model is calibrated for a more or less plausible set of parameters.12 The
instantaneous probability of death, β , is set equal to 4 percent a year, implying that
agents have a planning horizon of 25 years. The pure rate of time preference is
assumed to be 0.04. A Cobb-Douglas function is considered with a (before-tax)
wage share in net output of ε L =0.8. The benchmark model employs a moderate
value of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply (that is, ω LL = 2), which, taken
together with a low value of β , implies that the labor supply effect dominates the
generational turnover effect. In addition, it is assumed that initial tax rates are zero.
Given the values of the basic parameters (that is α , β , ω LL,a n d   ε L) and initial
taxes, the implied estimates are derived for the equilibrium output-capital ratio,
interest rate, and other relevant variables. The calibrated model is employed to
explore how the various taxes affect the path of intergenerational welfare. In addi-
tion, it is studied in what way this path is affected by initial tax rates, the intertem-
poral elasticity of labor supply, and the birth rate. 
Simulation Results
Table 3 presents the simulation results for three representative generations:
extremely old existing generations (denoted by dU(–∞ ,0 )), generations born at the
time of the policy shock (denoted by dU(0, 0)) and future steady-state generations
(denoted by dU(∞ , ∞ )). Introducing a capital tax benefits generations born at the
time of the policy shock, while welfare of old existing generations and generations
born far in the future declines. Old generations experience a bigger welfare loss than
future generations. The shape of the welfare profile induced by a capital tax can be
explained as follows. The capital tax depresses the rate of return on financial capital,
causing consumption of old generations—who predominantly consume out of finan-
cial capital—to fall. Generations born at the time of the policy change benefit from
the jump in wages on impact, which raises their full consumption. Future genera-
tions—who mainly consume out of human wealth13—experience a welfare loss due
to the fall in human wealth associated with a reduction in after-tax wage income,14
which is only partially offset by an improvement in the cost-of-living index. Similar
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12By substituting equation (1) in (2) and applying the Laplace transform method (see Judd, 1985,
1987a) to the loglinearized model as set out in Heijdra and Ligthart (2000), analytical expressions for the
welfare profiles of existing generations (with a generation index v≤ 0) and future generations (with
v=t ≥ 0) can be derived. These equations are employed in deriving the numerical results. 
13Human wealth is defined as the present discounted value of maximum after-tax wage income.
14Gross wages fall as a result of the introduction of the capital tax. However, receipts of age-
independent lump-sum transfer income—that is, the recycled revenues from the capital tax—attenuate the
fall in gross wage income somewhat. results for capital taxes are obtained by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), who simu-
late a multi-generation calibrated Diamond (1965) model for the U.S. economy.
The introduction of a labor tax yields a welfare gain to old and young existing
generations at the expense of future generations and generations born close to the
time of the policy change. Intuitively, the labor tax induces a fall in the after-tax
wage in the new steady state, which reduces human wealth and thus decreases
consumption of future generations. This deleterious effect is partly offset by the fall
in the cost-of-living index caused by the reduction in net wages. Old generations
gain substantially due to the beneficial effect of the reduction in the cost-of-living
index that exceeds the welfare loss prompted by the fall in the short-run rate of
interest. The pattern of welfare change is preserved for various values of the
intertemporal elasticity of labor supply and initial taxes. Higher intertemporal elas-
ticities of labor supply increase the welfare gain of old existing generations and
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Table 3. Intergenerational Welfare Effects of Taxation for Various Values 
of the Labor Supply Elasticity 
Shock Tax Rate dU(v,v) ω LL=1 ω LL=3 ω LL=6
∆ tK tK=0 d U(–∞ ,0) –3.796 –3.225 –2.941
dU(0,0) 0.706 0.358 0.209
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –0.024 –0.088 –0.073
ρ 59.78 62.79 65.38
tK= 0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) –3.612 –3.021 –2.722
dU(0,0) 0.513 0.253 0.145
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –0.199 –0.172 –0.120
ρ 54.05 56.48 58.83
∆ tL tL=0 d U(–∞ ,0) 3.710 5.778 6.710
dU(0,0) –0.357 –0.259 –0.164
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –0.694 –0.551 –0.369
ρ 61.23 66.25 68.90
tL= 0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) 3.402 5.521 6.535
dU(0,0) –0.699 –0.560 –0.375
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –1.017 –0.831 –0.564
ρ 38.31 42.75 45.18
∆ tC tC =0 d U(–∞ ,0) –9.361 –7.077 –6.016
dU(0,0) 1.241 0.530 0.284
dU(∞ ,∞ ) 1.018 0.280 0.096
ρ 48.57 49.29 50.98
tC =0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) –9.606 –7.296 –6.170
dU(0,0) 0.906 0.293 0.126
dU(∞ ,∞ ) 0.642 0.009 –0.085
ρ 39.63 31.61 27.14
Key: Parameter values are: α = 0.04, β = 0.04, and ε L = 0.8. The parameter ρ measures the
proportion of the existing population benefiting from a welfare improvement due to an increase in
the respective tax, and ω LL represents the intertemporal labor supply elasticity. reduce the welfare losses of future generations. It more or less pushes upward the
profile of welfare change. In contrast, higher initial taxes drag down the profile of
welfare change. This qualitative pattern also applies to initial taxes larger than those
presented in the table, but these results are not shown for the sake of brevity. 
The final tax policy experiment concerns the introduction of a consumption
tax, which benefits generations born at the time of the policy change and genera-
tions yet to be born at the expense of welfare of old existing generations.
Intuitively, an increase in the consumption tax raises the steady-state capital-labor
ratio,15 thereby pushing up the wage-rental ratio. As a result, human wealth
increases and thus full consumption of future generations rises in the new steady
state. However, old generations bear the full burden of the consumption tax rise.
Due to the fall in the rate of interest their consumption is reduced, more so the
older they are (in which case they consume a larger share out of financial capital). 
Table 3 also shows the percentage of the population alive that does not suffer a
welfare loss from a policy change.16This proportion, represented by ρ , can be inter-
preted as the degree of political support in a popular vote on introducing (or raising)
the tax under consideration. If decisions are made by a majority rule, both capital
and labor taxes are viable policy instruments even when (intertemporal) labor
supply is relatively inelastic. Labor taxes get the most political support, which is not
surprising given that they yield a welfare gain to old generations. Political support
for capital and labor taxes increases for higher values of the labor supply elasticity.
However, introducing consumption taxes can count on the least political support
given that old generations lose out the most.17 Political support for further tax
increases declines in all three cases, but the fall in support is much larger for labor
taxes than for capital taxes. Table 4 shows that political support for consumption
and capital taxes is strong for low birth rates (represented by a low β ), but declines
as the expected lifetime of individuals decreases and thus the generations become
more disconnected. Conversely, labor taxes get more political support if birth rates
rise, reflecting the smaller welfare loss experienced by young generations and
generations born at the time of the policy change. 
IV. Policy Discussion
The present section tries to link the analytical results from the previous sections to
the recent tax policy debate on consumption taxes in OECD countries. To this end,
some of the rather stylized assumptions of the model are relaxed; policy issues are
discussed in a broader context, which includes aspects of reality such as unem-
ployment, inflation, and income differences within generations. 
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15The consumption tax decreases both the long-run capital stock and the long-run level of employ-
ment, but the fall in the latter is bigger so that the capital-labor ratio rises.
16These values are computed for a 1 percent rise in the respective tax rate. Alternatively, one could
look at the degree of political support for tax increases that raise an equivalent amount of revenue, in
which case tax base effects would matter. 
17Note that the government can, if it wants to, issue bonds to compensate old generations for the
welfare loss so as to make the introduction of consumption or capital taxes less painful. Future genera-
tions are taxed when the public debt is redeemed.The previous sections showed that capital taxes reduce savings and, given the
closed economy setting, concomitantly reduce investment and the physical capital
stock. Higher labor taxes also reduce capital formation and employment provided that
intertemporal labor supply is sufficiently flexible. The capital-labor ratio and wage-
rental ratio are unaffected by labor taxes, however, a result that crucially depends on
the assumption of a unit intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure. But, if households can easily substitute leisure for consumption at a given
point in time, labor taxes typically increase the capital intensity of production. This
may be an undesirable implication for economies that suffer from high rates of unem-
ployment and feature capital-intensive production structures.
Allocation results for consumption taxes are quite different. Increases in
consumption taxes increase the steady-state capital stock if the positive investment
effect associated with generational turnover dominates the intertemporal labor supply
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Table 4. Intergenerational Welfare Effects of Taxation for Various Values 
of the Birth Rate 
Shock Tax Rate dU(v,v) β =1 β =3 β =6
∆ tK tK=0 d U(–∞ ,0) –5.690 –4.682 –2.683
dU(0,0) 0.587 0.553 0.400
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –0.220 –0.155 –0.042
ρ 64.85 63.98 58.97
tK= 0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) –5.372 –4.418 –2.529
dU(0,0) 0.362 0.367 0.297
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –0.402 –0.308 –0.131
ρ 53.69 55.35 54.06
∆ tL tL=0 d U(–∞ ,0) 7.763 6.586 4.130
dU(0,0) –0.585 –0.457 –0.232
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –1.023 –0.855 –0.513
ρ 46.14 54.15 70.38
tL= 0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) 7.288 6.192 3.895
dU(0,0) –1.114 –0.902 –0.506
dU(∞ ,∞ ) –1.530 –1.275 –0.765
ρ 24.10 31.04 47.56
∆ tC tC =0 d U(–∞ ,0) –12.482 –10.445 –6.297
dU(0,0) 1.099 0.954 0.603
dU(∞ ,∞ ) 0.678 0.593 0.406
ρ 59.28 55.00 44.39
tC =0.10 dU(–∞ ,0) –12.901 –10.786 –6.489
dU(0,0) 0.633 0.571 0.382
dU(∞ ,∞ ) 0.156 0.161 0.155
ρ 41.10 38.66 31.54
Key: Parameter values are: α = 0.04, ω LL=2 , and  ε L = 0.8. The parameter ρ measures the
proportion of the existing population benefiting from a welfare improvement due to an increase in
the respective tax, and ω LL represents the intertemporal labor supply elasticity.effect. If this condition is not met, investment and savings decline, and consequently
the long-run capital stock and output fall, but by less than that for labor taxes. Results
from a plausibly calibrated version of the model indicate that the labor supply effect
is likely to dominate even for quite high values of the death rate. Without overlapping
generations—and thus a zero death/birth rate—consumption and labor taxes have an
equivalent (negative) effect on aggregate savings and output. However, the reduction
in the capital stock is larger than with finitely lived households because the positive
investment effect of generational turnover is absent.
During the past two decades, in view of their relatively high labor tax burden,
various OECD countries implemented tax reforms aimed at switching the burden
of taxation away from labor to broad-based consumption taxes (via increases in
value-added tax (VAT) rates and extension of the VAT base).18 The extended Yaari-
Blanchard model can be employed to show why such a strategy is appealing to
countries with low savings rates. Take the case of a one-for-one substitution of
consumption for labor taxes. This type of reform leaves the CSE curve unaffected,
but shifts the CFE curve to the right, boosting household savings, consumption,
and capital accumulation in the new long-run equilibrium. Employment is unaf-
fected; the higher capital stock increases labor demand but this is exactly offset by
a reduction in labor supply induced by a rise in consumption.
Alternatively, countries may contemplate revenue-neutral swaps of consump-
tion taxes for labor taxes.19 In this case, the consumption tax has to rise less than
one for one, owing to the fact that a tax on consumption is more efficient than a tax
on labor income.20 Intuitively, both instruments tax labor income,21 but consump-
tion taxes have a broader base because they also tax the returns from the initial
holdings of financial assets and transfer income. This basically amounts to a lump-
sum tax on initial wealth. The policy literature (e.g., OECD (1995)) has suggested
that this type of reform may have a beneficial effect on employment, but is not
specific about under what circumstances this is likely to materialize. In general, one
could say that the following conditions need to be met: (i) the base of the consump-
tion tax is relatively broad; and (ii) the difference in marginal efficiency costs in the
initial tax system is large. In particular, the marginal excess burden of the initial
labor tax should be high and the consumption tax burden should primarily fall on
the production factor with low marginal efficiency costs (that is, capital). Relative
efficiency costs of labor and capital taxes, on their turn, depend on the level of
initial taxes, the wage elasticity of labor supply (determining the size of the distor-
tion along the labor-leisure margin), and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(determining the distortion along the intertemporal dimension).22
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18See OECD (1995) for an overview of the policy discussion on coordinated labor-consumption tax
reforms.
19A full analysis of this reform—using numerical simulations—is beyond the scope of the present
paper. Instead, an intuitive account of the effects is provided.
20Note that the labor income tax will vary over time reflecting changes in the labor and consumption
tax bases during transition.
21As is well known, taxes on consumption are implicit taxes on labor that produce both labor and
commodity market distortions.
22Specifically, distortions are larger, the higher the initial tax rates and the larger the elasticities of
labor supply and intertemporal substitution.Besides the aforementioned beneficial effects, the literature has also indicated
some concerns with consumption taxes due to their distributional impact. First,
they are generally considered to be regressive intragenerationally; that is, the
income distribution is shifted in favor of high-income taxpayers who consume a
lower proportion of their income. In addition, higher consumption taxes are likely
to increase the general price level shifting part of the burden to those households
whose income is not indexed against inflation. In practice, low-income households
are often somewhat protected against this effect by preferential tax rates charged
on basic food items and well-targeted subsidy programs. Second, consumption
and labor taxes have disparate effects on the intergenerational distribution of
welfare. The present model shows that consumption taxes are progressive across
generations; households that consume out of the return on their financial assets—
that is, wealthy, old generations—are hit harder by a consumption tax than young
working households.
V. Concluding Remarks
The paper has extended the Yaari-Blanchard model of overlapping generations to
study the intertemporal macroeconomic and welfare effects of tax policy. The
graphical analysis shows that capital taxes reduce savings and discourage capital
formation in the steady state, whereas labor taxes reduce the capital stock provided
intertemporal labor supply is endogenous. In addition, the short- and long-run
effects of tax changes differ. For example, the capital tax increases the capital-
labor ratio in the short run, but ultimately the new steady-state capital-labor ratio
is below its initial value.
Results are less definite for consumption taxes because the labor supply and
generational turnover effects work in opposite directions. If the generational
turnover effect dominates, an increase in consumption taxes leads to a rise in the
long-run capital stock. The equivalence between consumption and labor taxes,
which applies in a representative agent model, thus fails to hold in an overlapping-
generations context. Results from a plausibly calibrated version of the model indi-
cate, however, that the labor supply effect is likely to be dominant even for quite
high values of the death rate. As a result, consumption taxes depress the capital
stock, but by a smaller amount than in a representative agent model, reflecting the
positive investment effect of generational turnover. 
Simulation experiments demonstrate that capital and consumption taxes
reduce welfare of existing generations, more so the older the generations are,
reflecting the higher share of interest-bearing assets in their portfolios.
Intuitively, both consumption and capital taxes depress the long-run rate of
interest and thus reduce the household’s capital income. Generations born at the
time of the introduction of these taxes enjoy a welfare gain, however, because
their full consumption increases. The welfare effects of labor taxes are drastically
different. Old generations gain in terms of welfare, but future generations born in
the new steady state lose out. Consequently, from a political point of view, the
introduction of labor taxes is likely to get the largest support in a popular vote on
the three taxes.
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In this appendix the schedules underlying the phase diagram (see Figure 1)—that is, the capital
stock equilibrium (CSE) and consumption flow equilibrium (CFE) locus—are derived. 
Equilibrium Employment
By using labor demand (equation (T.4)) and labor supply (that can be derived from equation
(T.3)), and the production function (equation (T.6)), an expression is obtained relating equilib-
rium employment to the variables C and K:
(A.1)
where t ≡ (tC + tL)/(1 – tL) denotes the tax wedge faced by the household and Ω (L) is a
decreasing function in the economically meaningful interval L∈ [0,1]. Equilibrium employment
depends negatively on consumption and the tax wedge and positively on the capital stock.
The Capital Stock Equilibrium Schedule
The capital stock equilibrium (CSE) locus represents the collection of points in the (C,K) space
for which net investment is zero and thus Y = C. We note from equations (T.3) and (T.4) that:
(A.2)
where ω LL denotes the leisure-labor ratio. Since Y = C along the CSE curve, it follows that
employment LCSE along that line is given by:
(A.3)
Note that if labor supply is exogenous (i.e., ε C=1 ,so that LCSE =1), then consumption and
labor taxes do not affect steady-state employment. In the case of endogenous labor supply,
represented by 0 < ε C < 1, a rise in the tax wedge reduces employment along the CSE curve.
Using equation (A.3) in the production function (equation (T.6)) and using equation (T.2) in
steady-state format, an expression for the CSE curve can be derived:
(A.4)
which is a concave upward sloping function through the origin—see Figure 1.
The Consumption Flow Equilibrium Schedule
The consumption flow locus represents all points in the (C,K) space for which aggregate
consumption is in equilibrium. By using equation (T.1) in steady state and equations (T.5) and
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where y ≡ Y/K is the output-capital ratio. The CFE line can be described by parametrically
varying L in the feasible interval [0,1]. Solving equation (A.5) for the economically meaningful
root yields the output-capital ratio as a function of employment, initial taxes, and the various
preference and technology parameters:
(A.7)
By using this result in equation (A.6) an expression for the capital-labor ratio is obtained:
(A.8)
from which the following limiting results can be derived:
(A.9)
The labor market equilibrium condition (equation (A.1)) can be rewritten to arrive at an
expression for consumption:
(A.10)
from which the following limiting results can be derived:
(A.11)
(A.12)
This implies that the CFE line has the same vertical intercept as the CFE line for a representa-
tive agent model—represented by the dashed downward sloping line—if laborers decide not to
supply any labor (i.e., L→ 0). If laborers work all of their available time (i.e., L→ 1), however,
then the CFE line goes through the origin.
In the representative agent model, with β =0 ,the CFE locus can be represented by y= y –.
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125showing that the CSE curve is linear and downward sloping. It can be shown—though it is
somewhat tedious to do so—that the CFE line for the overlapping-generations model is down-
ward sloping and steeper than the CFE curve for a representative agent model.
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